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NOTES
A DUE PROCESS DILEMMA-
JURIES FOR JUVENILES
Nineteenth Century America was a period in which vast social
changes were accomplished. The industrial revolution was in full
swing and the promotion of such causes as laborers' and women's
rights, prison reform and child protection were advocated by the
contemporary reformers.1 Promotion of these causes resulted in
the strengthening of children's rights and interests through the
establishment of separate judicial proceedings whereby individual-
ized justice could be administered to youthful offenders.
Even before the enactment of juvenile court acts, jurisdictions
recognized that youghful offenders ought to be treated separately
from hardened adult criminals. As early as 1869, Massachusetts
enacted a special provision for probation of juveniles and, in 1870,
provided separate hearings for children's cases in Suffolk County.2
By 1877, New York provided separate detention facilities for children
and, in 1892, separate trials, dockets and records for children under
sixteen years of age were established. 3 Likewise, the North
Dakota Constitution of 1899 provided for a State Reform School4
which was favorably acted upon by the first Legislative Assembly. 5
The Juvenile Court of Cook County, Illinois, established in 18996
is generally recognized to be the first formal juvenile tribunal.7
Judge Julian Mach, a prominent advocate of the juvenile system
and second judge of the Cook County Juvenile Court is often quoted
for his description of the juvenile system's laudable purposes and
philosophy:
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt
with as a criminal; to save it from the brand of criminality,
the brand that sticks to it for life; to take it in hand and in-
stead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it
from the stigma, - this is the work which is now being ac-
1. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1927).
2. P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 388 (1960).
3. Id.
4. N.D. CONST. § 215 (1889).
5. N.D. LAws ch. 164 (1890). These provisions were later incorporated Into the
REVISED CODES OF NORTH DAKOTA (1895).
6. LAws OF ILL. p.131 (1899). Reproduced in part in TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
555 (1949).
7. S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, ONE THOUSAND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS 12 (1943).
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complished by dealing even with most of the delinquent chil-
dren through the court that represents the parens patriae
power of the state, the court of chancery."
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this
boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how
has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career.9
A comparison of the present treatment of juveniles with the
philosophy of the juvenile system of justice has led to the comment
that "[t]he rhetoric of the juvenile court movement has developed
without any necessarily close correspondence to the realities of
the court and institutional routines."'' 0 Nearly seventy years have
passed since the first juvenile court was established. During that
time, juveniles and society have changed considerably. Dissatis-
faction with the fruits of the system have been manifested from at
least two entirely different viewpoints. On the one hand, critics
point to the magnitude of the current juvenile problem." On the
other hand, they charge that the distinction between the "criminal"
and "delinquent" label does not justify the disparity of treatment
between adults and juveniles. They disclose that funds are un-
available to supply the experts and medical facilities envisioned by
the pioneers of the juvenile court movement; that existing staffs
often lack the training and skills required to carry out the treatment
prescribed by the court; that many judges are inadequately trained
8. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909).
9. Id. at 119-120.
10. S. WHEELER, L. COTTRELL & A. ROMASCO, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ITS PREVENTION
AND CONTROL 35 (1966).
11. The UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS of 1967 indicate that persons ten to seventeen years
of age make up 15 per cent of the total population of the United States, but the same
age group accounted for 33 per cent of all offenses solved in 1967. When considering
only serious crimes for the seven preceeding years, the Report indicated that arrests in
the under eighteen age group rose 69 per cent. The arrest of juveniles for violent crimes
doubled during that period. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1967).
In 1966, approximately 745,000 delinquency cases (excluding traffic violations) were
handled by juvenile courts throughout the United States. Approximately 357,500 of these
cases were handled judicially. This represented a 9 per cent incresase over the previous
year, while the child population between the ages of ten and seventeen increased 2 per
cent during the same period. As of June 30, 1966, approximately 51,000 children were
living in various types of institutions where 20 per cent will be detained for one year
or more. Thirty-nine percent of these institutions were housing more than their stated
capacity while another 25 per cent were filled to within 10 per cent of capacity. DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1966, CHILDREN'S
BUREAU STATISTICAL SERIES 90 (1966); DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
STATISTICS ON PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS FOR DELINQUENT CHILDREN 1966, CHILDREN'S BUREAU
STATISTICAL SERIES 89.
During 1967, 8,683 cases were referred to North Dakota juvenile commissioners.
This figure represents a 5.9 per cent increase in the number of cases referred over the
previous year. Of this number, 48.4 per cent were delinquency cases (excluding traffic
violations) of which 21.9 per cent were handled by petition. PUBLIC WELFARE BOARD
OF NORTH DAKOTA, DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, NORTH DAKOTA JUVENILE
COURT STATISTICS, REPORT NO. 34 (1967).
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to administer to the needs of the juvenile; and that reform schools
are no more than "junior prisons. ' '12
This article evaluates two institutions within our jurisprudential
system-the juvenile court and the criminal jury. In so doing, it
examines:
I. Due process standards in juvenile proceedings;
II. Jury trial as fundamental due process requirement;
III. Merits of jury - juvenile issue.
PART I. DUE PROCESS IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
The United States Supreme Court, in Kent v. United States,13
raised a warning that certain constitutional rights must be applied
to juvenile proceedings to assure a juvenile fundamental fairness
and due process. Although the case presented no constitutional
issue,14 the decision contained strong implications of how the Court
would rule upon the constitutionality of certain juvenile court pro-
cedures.1
5
Before waiving jurisdiction over Morris Kent to criminal court,
the juvenile court judge held no hearing, made no findings, gave
no reason for waiver and did not mention or consider the motion
for a hearing on the question of waiver that was made by Morris
Kent's counsel. The Supreme Court held that a waiver proceeding
is a "critically important" stage of a delinquency proceeding which
must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment. Therefore, in waiver proceedings, a juvenile is
entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the
social records and probation or similar reports which pre-
sumably are considered by the court, and to a statement
of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. 6
Following Kent, the landmark decision of In re Gault1 was
decided. That case involved a juvenile who was accused of making
12. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW -ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIMn 7-8 (1967)
(hereinafter referred to as TASK FORCE REPORT) ; H. JAMES, CRISIS IN THE COURTS ch. 4
(1968) ; S. WHEELER, L. COTTRELL & A. ROMASCO, supra note 10; Ketcham, The Unfilled
Promise of the American Juvenile Court, IN JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 33-35 (M. Rosenheim
ed. 1962) ; Paulsen, The Juvenile Court and the Whole of the Law, 11 WAYNE I REV. 597,
615-616 (1965) ; Rappeport, Determination of Deiinquency in the Juvenile Court: A Sug-
gested Approach 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 123, 126.
13. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
14. The Supreme Court was asked to interpret a waiver provision of the District of
Columbia Code. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 66 (1967); Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due
Process of Law, 19 JUVENILE COURT JUDGES JOURNAL 9, 14 (1968).
15. See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 167 (1966).
16. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
17. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For a comprehensive analysis of this decision see Dorsen &
Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMILY L.Q. 1 (1966).
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lewd and indecent remarks over the telephone to a woman who
lived nearby. The accused, Gerald Gault, was never informed of his
right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, neither he
nor his parents were given notice of the specific charges against
him, and Gerald was never confronted by the complaining party.
Gerald Gault was found guilty of a statute providing that a person
who "in the presence or hearing of any woman or child . . .uses
vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a misdemeanor"
which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by a fine
of $5 to $50 or imprisonment for not more than two months."" Since
the boy was previously before the court for being in the company
of another boy who had stolen a wallet, Gerald was also found delin-
quent in that he was a "child who habitually so deports himself
as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others."'19
Being a juvenile, he was not fined $50, nor was he imprisoned for
two months. The fifteen year old boy was placed in the custody
of the State Industrial School until he reached twenty-one "unless
sooner discharged by due process of law."
In finding the proceeding defective, the Supreme Court held:
[1.] Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must
be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceed-
ings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be af-
forded, and it must "set forth the alleged misconduct with
particularity."*** Due process of law requires notice of the
sort . . . which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in
a civil or criminal proceeding.20
[2.] [T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine de-
linquency which may result in commitment to an institu-
tion in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child
and his parent must be notified of the child's right to be
represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are
unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child.2 1
[3.] [T]he constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is applicable in the case of juveniles, as it is with
respect to adults. 22
[4.] [A]bsent a valid confession, a determination of de-
linquency and an order of commitment to a state institution
cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony sub-
jected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance
with our law and constitutional requirements. 2
18. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956).
19. Id. at § 8-201(6)(d).
20. In re Gault, supra note 14, at 33.
21. Id. at 41.
22. Id. at 55.
23. Id. at 57.
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The most significant aspect of this decision, for purposes of
this article, was the reasoning adopted by the Court in applying
specific Bill of Rights guarantees to juvenile proceedings. The outer
limits of the decision were precisely outlined when the Court
stated that its rulings were directed only to delinquency proceedings;
that only the adjudicatory stage of the delinquency proceeding was
considered; and that the decision applied only to those delinquency
proceedings which could result in a child's commitment to a state
institution.2 4 The unsettling feature of the Gault decision, however,
was its failure to provide any standards to aid in the determination
of which, if any, guarantees of the Bill of Rights not already appli-
cable should apply to juvenile proceedings2 5 and in what manner.
An analysis of the decision indicates that the Court will apply
the Bill of Rights on an ad hoc basis and will not necessarily apply
those rights in the same manner they are applied in state criminal
proceedings. In the past, a majority of the Court has applied the
Bill of Rights to state criminal proceedings on an ad hoc or selective
incorporation basis.2 6 Through a process of elimination, it would
appear that once again the Court adopted this approach.2 7 The
concurring opinions of Justices Black and Douglas indicate that
their views of "total incorporation" and "no incorporation," res-
pectively, were not adopted . 2  In applying specific Bill of Rights
provisions to juvenile proceedings, the Court was careful to point
out that:
[T]he features of the juvenile system which its propo-
nents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired
by constitutional domestication.2 9
We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be
held must conform with all of the requirements of a crimi-
nal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but
we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essen-
tials of due process and fair treatment. 0
24. Id. at 18.
25. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan stated: "I am unable to determine
with any certainty by what standards the Court decides that Arizona'S juvenile courts do
not satisfy the obligations of due process." Id. at 66. See algo Dorsen & Rezneck, supra
note 17, at 8.
26. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
27. Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 17, at 10-11.
28. Mr. Justice Black stated: "I think the Constitution requires that he be tried In
accordance with the guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." In re Gault, supra note 14, at 61.
Mr. Justice Harlan believed that: "[Tlhe problem here is to determine what forms
of procedural protection are necessary to guarantee the fundamental fairness of juvenile
proceedings, and not which of the procedures now employed in criminal trials should be
transplanted intact to proceedings in these specialized courts." In re Gault, supra note 14,
at 74.
29. In re Gault, supra note 14, at 22.
30. Id. at 30, quoting from Kent v. United States, supra note 16, at 562.
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Thus, the Supreme Court appears to have made the following
-evaluations of juvenile proceedings: 1. that the adjudicatory stages
of delinquency proceedings are similar to their criminal fact-finding
counterpart; 2. that certain constitutional safeguards which exist
in state criminal proceedings will be applied to the adjudicatory
stage of delinquency proceedings; 3. that the provisions of the Bill
of Rights will apply to delinquency proceedings on an ad hoc basis;
4. that these provisions will apply to such proceedings when the
child is faced with the possible consequence of confinement in a
state institution; 5. that provisions found applicable to delinquency
proceedings will not necessarily be governed by the same standards
as when they are applied to state criminal proceedings.
PART II. JURY TRIAL AS FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT
Although the original source of the criminal jury trial is un-
certain, 81 trial by jury was well-established by the time it was
introduced in the United States. Authorities point to the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215 as a significant event leading to our present
system of trial by jury.3 2 There, the church of Rome proclaimed
that clergy would not perform any religious ceremonies relating
to trial by ordeal. As a result of this action, a form of jury trial
was instituted to replace trial by ordeal.
At first, the jury was no more regarded as "rational" than
the ordeals which it replaced, and just as one did not ques-
tion the judgements of God as shown by the ordeal, so the
verdict of a jury was equally inscrutable. It is but slowly that
the jury was rationalized and regarded as a judicial body.33
[T]he completely rational view of jury trial finally tri-
umphed in 1856. .... 34
The Declaration of Rights, enacted by Parliament under William
and Mary in 1689, is said to be a direct ancestor of the first ten
amendments to the United States Constitution.35 One clause of
that enactment provided for trial by jury.36
A series of formal documents, culminating in the adoption of
our Constitution, stressed the high regard colonists had for the right
to be tried by a jury. The first formal assertion of the right to trial
31. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 649 (2d ed. 1898).
3,2. 1 W. IIOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 323 (1927); T. PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 118 (1956).
33. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 32 at 125.
34. Id . at 128.
35. R. PERRY & J. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 244 (1959).
36. "That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned, and jurors which pass
upon men in trials for high treaon ought to be freeholders." Id. at 247.
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by jury made to the king was in the "Resolutions of the Stamp Act
Congress." There, the colonists objected to the Stamp Act being
enforced by the court of admiralty without provision for a jury
trial. 37  This assertion was also included among the grievances
aired by the First Continental Congress38 and again in the Declara-
tion of Independence. 9 Finally, the right to a trial by jury was
enunciated twice in the United States Constitution. Article III, section
2 declares that "[t]he trial of all crimes, except in cases of im-
peachment, shall be by jury" while the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees that:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted.
The right to a trial by jury first extended to juveniles and
adults alike.4 0 The first juvenile court act even provided for jury
trials. 41 Juveniles, however, began losing their right to trial
by jury shortly after the first juvenile court enactment. Common-
wealth v. Fisher4 2 is perhaps the landmark case upholding the
constitutionality of juvenile court acts. In denying the right to a jury
trial in juvenile proceedings, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
explained:
Whether the child deserves to be saved by the state is no
more a question for a jury than whether the father, if able to
save it, ought to save it.
4
3
Today, the right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings is
denied in nearly all jurisdictions except those specifically providing
the right by statute. Most courts denying the right, reason that
the juvenile proceeding is civil, not criminal, and that, therefore,
the constitutional safeguards applicable to criminal proceedings do
37. The seventh declaration of the "Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress" of 1765
stated: "That trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject
in these colonies." Id. at 270.
.J. "That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more
especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the
vicinage, according to the course of that law." Id. at 288.
39. The Declaration of Independence declared that the crown had been " ... depriving
us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury . 1..." I Stat. 1.
40. Ex parte Becknell, 119 Cal. 496, 51 P. 692 (1897), contra, Ex parte Ah Peen, 51 Cal.
280 (1876) ; People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 8 Ain.Rep. 645 (1870) ; State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406,
56 Am.Rep.529 (1885) ; Matter of Daniecki, 117 N.J. Eq. 527, 177 A. 91 (1935). See also
Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387, 400-401 (1961)
Fortas, Equal Rights-for Whom, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 401, 405 (1967).
41. "[I]n all trials under this act any person interested therein may demand a jury of
six, or the judge of his own motion may order a jury of the same number, to try the
case." LAWS OF ILL. § 2 (1899) cited in GLUECK, supra note 7, at 13.
42. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905).
43. Id.
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not apply. '4  Other courts have denied this right on grounds that
the juvenile is charged with delinquency and not a specific criminal
offense; 45 that the right to a jury trial is not indispensible to due
process;46  and that the juvenile proceeding is not a trial.47  Only
twelve jurisdictions provide some form of jury trial for juveniles.4 8
Twenty-seven other jurisdictions specifically deny juveniles the right
to a jury trial.4 9 Recent court decisions in two jurisdictions have
overruled statutes that denied the right to a jury trial in delinquency
proceedings.50
It is ironical to note that most jurisdictions denying jury trials
in juvenile proceedings base their decision upon our Anglo-American
heritage and the fact that, historically, juvenile proceedings were
equitable and not criminal. Yet, today in England all children over
fourteen years of age who are charged with indictable offenses are
provided and must be informed of the right to a jury trial.51
Another reason that has been asserted for denying jury trials
44. Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923): Dinson v. Drostra, 39 Ind.App.
432, 80 N.E. 32 (1907) considered in light of State ex rel Duffy v. Lake Juvenile Court,
Lake County, 238 Ind. 404, 151 N.E.2d 293 (1958) ; Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813,
229 N.W. 205 (1929); Marlow v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106, 133 S.W. 1137 (1911);
Commonwealth v. Bigwood, 334 Mass. 46, 133 N.E.2d 585 (1956); State ex rel Olson v.
Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892); In re Hans, 174 Neb. 612, 119 N.W.2d 72
(1963) ; In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184 A.2d 449 (1962) ; State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34,
104 A.2d 21 (1954) ; Ex parte Watson, 157 N.C. 340, 72 S.E. 1049 (1911) ; In re Whitting-
ton, 13 Ohio App.2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 333 (1967) ; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62
A. 198 (1905) ; Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 P. 609 (1907) ; In re Gomez, 113 Vt 224,
32 A.2d 138 (1943).
Courts taking this view in cases involving non-criminal conduct include: Ex parte
Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1928) ; Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 302, 45 So. 499 (1907)
Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928).
45. Ex parte State ex rel. Echols, 17 So.2d 449 (Ala. 1944) ; Martin v. State, 213 Ark.
507, 211 S.W.2d 116 (1948).
46. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa.Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9, 12 (1967).
47. In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908).
48. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (Supp. 1966) ; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-8-2 (1964)
D.C. CODE ENCYCLOPEDIA § 16-2307 (1961) ; RAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1967);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. ch. 712A. 17 (1968); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 10-603 (1947);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110, (Supp. 1968) ; S.D. CODE § 43.0331 (1939) ; TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13(b) (Vernon Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4904(53)
(1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(2) (1957); WVYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-108(c) (1961).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 5063 (1964), found partially unconstitutional in Nieves v. United States,
280 F.Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; ALA. CODE, tit. 13, § 369 (1969) ; Aru. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-229 (1956) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-206 (1964) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1175 (SupP.
1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.09(2) (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2420 (1959); HAWAI
REV. LAWS § 333-19, [1 SESSION LAWS OF HAWAII act 232 (1965)J; IDAHO CODE ANN. §
16-1813 (Supp. 1967) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-3215 (Supp. 1968) ; IOwA CODE ANN. § 232.27
(Supp. 1968) ; KY. REV. STAT. § 208.060 (1962) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1579 (West
1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155 (Supp. 1967); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185.08 (1942);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-206.03 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REv. STAT. § 62.190(3) (1963) ; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4-35 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-49 (Supp. 1967); jury provision found
unconstitutional in Peyton v. Nord, 437 P.2d 716 (N.M. 1968), at least where criminal
laws require trial by jury; N.Y. CRIM. PIoc. LAW § 913--h (McKinney 1958) ; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 27-16-18 (Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (1964) ; ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 419.498 (Supp. 1967) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 247 (1954) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-94
(Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 33, § 651(a) (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.04.030 (1962).
50. Nieves v. United States, 280 F.Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) partially overruling 18
U.S.C. § 5033 (1964) ; Peyton v. Nord, 437 P.2d 716 (N.M. 1968) found N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-8-49 (Supp. 1967) unconstitutional.
51. MAOISTRATES' COuRTs ACT OF 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 55; 21 Halsbury's
Laws of England, Part 7, § 4, 696 (3rd ed. 1957).
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in delinquency proceedings is that the jury trial provision of the
Sixth Amendment has never been applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 52 This argument can
no longer be asserted. A recent Supreme Court decision, Duncan
v. Louisiana,53 applied the jury trial provision, by way of the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause, to state criminal proceedings
involving serious offenses. In that case, a nineteen year old boy
was convicted of simple battery which, under Louisiana law, was
a misdemeanor, punishable by two years imprisonment and a
$300 fine. 54 The trial judge relied upon the testimony of four white
youths that the defendant slapped one of the white boys on the
elbow. The defendant and other Negro witnesses testified that the
defendant was merely "touched." Defendant was convicted and
sentenced to sixty days in prison and a $150 fine. On appeal, appellant
contended that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Uited
State Constitution guaranteed him the right to a trial by jury.
The State of Louisiana relied upon three cases for the proposition
that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial should not apply to
state criminal proceedings. Those cases, Maxwell v. Dow, 55 Palko
v. Connecticut,5 and Snyder v. Massachusetts57 were found not to
be binding upon the Court. Maxwell v. Dow58 held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent a
state from trying a defendant for a non-capital offense with fewer
than twelve persons on the jury. 9 Mr. Justice Cardozo's statements
in Snyder" as well as his often-quoted assertion in Palko6 ' indicate
his belief that a jury trial is not essential to ordered liberty. The
right to a jury trial, however, was not at issue in either case. Mr.
Justice Cardozo cited four cases in Snyder and Palko to support
his opinion, but an examination of them discloses that three cases
were civil,6 2 not criminal, and the fourth, Maxwell v. Dow,63
considered only the constitutionality of a jury panel made up of
52. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9, 12 (1967).
53. Supra note 26.
54. It is interesting to note that because the defendant was nineteen years old and
treated as an adult criminal instead of sixteen and treated as a juvenile, he was subject
to possible incarceration for a maximum of two years instead of five. LA. REv. STAT. tit.
13, § § 1570, 1572.
55. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
56. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
57. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
58. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
59. Id. at 605.
60. "Consistently with . . . [the Fourteenth Amendment], trial by jury may be abo-
lished." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 39 (1934).
61. "The right of a trial by jury . . . may have value and importance. Even so, they
are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty . . . Few would be so narrow
or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be im-
possible without them." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
62. Wagner Electric Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226 (1922) ; N.Y. Central P. Co. v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1916) ; Walker v. Sauvient, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
63. Supra note 58.
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less than twelve persons. Therefore, the jury issue presented in
Duncan was not settled by any of the aforementioned cases.
In applying the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision to state
criminal proceedings, Mr. Justice White appears to have altered the
standard used in prior decisions. Because of the significance of this
possible change, a portion of Mr. Justice White's comments are
restated here.
Earlier the Court can be seen as having asked when in-
quiring into whether some particular procedural safeguard
was required of a State if a civilized system could be im-
agined that would not accord the particular protection. [The
Court cited Palko v. Connecticut 302 U. S. 319, 325 for this
proposition.]
[Recent cases indicate that the question] is whether given
this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental-
whether, that is a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty.
When the inquiry is approached in this way the question
whether the States can impose criminal punishment without
granting a jury trial appears quite different from the way it
appeared in the older cases opining that States might
abolish jury trial. See, e.g. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.
581 ... .64
After conducting this preliminary analysis of the issue, the Court
proceeded to find "that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a
right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be
tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee."6 In determining whether an offense is petty or one
which requires the right to a jury trial, the court said it looks
to the possible consequences resulting from the offense and not
to the actual penalty invoked in the particular case. 6 Seven jus-
tices believed that the jury trial provision of the Sixth Amendment
ought to be applied to state criminal proceedings. Mr. Justice
Douglas joined Mr. Justice Black in a concurring opinion which
restated their belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to make the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states.67 Only
Justices Stewart and Harlan dissented, contending that the jury
trial is not an element of "fundamental fairness" necessary to secure
due process.68
64. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 26 at 149, 150 n. 14.
65. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 26.
66. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937), cited in Duncan v. Louisiana,
supra note 26, at 160.
67. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 26, at 163.
68. Id. at 171-172.
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As one authority commented before the Duncan decision, the
question of whether juveniles will be granted the right to a jury
trial in delinquency proceedings is still open. 69 The Duncan de-
cision has removed a major barrier that has prevented access to
jury trials in delinquency proceedings, but the matter has not been
clearly resolved. Therefore, further analysis of the merits of this
issue is necessary.
PART III. MERITS OF JURY-JUVENILE ISSUE
The view that a jury trial is not required in juvenile proceedings
is supported by several influential sources. One source, the Na-
tional Council on Crime and Delinquency, states that juvenile hear-
ings should be separate and heard without a jury.70 An explanation
for such a view is contained in the comment to that section which
states:
Formal procedure is incompatible with the informal confer-
ence atmosphere required by the court to gain the confi-
dence of child and parents, to elicit tht pertinent facts of
events, and to become familiar with the personalities of the
parties, their emotional states, and the causes of the diffi-
culty - all of which is of the utmost importance to a wise
disposition of the case.71
This statement infers that a jury trial would increase the formality
of juvenile hearings and thus hamper the dispositional phase of
the juvenile process. The Standard Juvenile Court Act made no
provision for separate adjudicatory and dispositional hearings and
consequently did not consider the important distinction between these
two processes as the Supreme Court did in Gault. Had such a
distinction been made in the Act, the quoted comment would have
had significance as it related to the dispositional hearing but not
to the adjudicative phase. The Gault decision declares that
adjudicatory hearings must
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment.
The problems of pre - adjudication treatment of juveniles,
and of post-adjudication disposition, are unique to the ju-
venile process; hence what we hold in this opinion with re-
gard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory
69. Dorsen & Rezneck, saupra note 17, at 22.
70. "Cases of children . . . shall be dealt with by the court at hearings separate from
those for adults and without a jury. The hearings shall be conducted in an informal man-
ner and may be adjourned from time to time." STANDARD JUV1NILR COURT ACT, art. V.,
§ 19 (6th ed.) (adopted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency).
71. Comment to STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT, id. at 48. (Emphasis added).
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stage has no necessary applicability to other steps of the
juvenile process.7 2
A second source, the Children's Bureau of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, in its Standards for Juvenile and
Family Courts, does not recommend jury trials in delinquency pro-
ceedings. They contend that such proceedings are not criminal and
that juries are incompatible with the informal setting of the court
hearing.73  It is significant to note, however, that these recommen-
dations were published before the Gault decision was announced.7 4
Therefore, the reasoning employed by Standards in denying the
right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings is questionable,
especially since Gault noted that certain delinquency proceedings
resemble criminal adjudications 75 and that informality will not
take priority over the requirement of due process and fair treat-
ment.
7 6
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice also recommended that juveniles be denied
juries. 77 Because the Report was finalized before the Gault decision
was announced, however, the Commission conceded that a portion
of their findings might be subject to alteration. 78 The Commission,
in recommending the denial of jury trials, relied upon statements
by Dean Monrad G. Paulsen, 79 an authority in the field of juvenile
law, and Mr. Justice Cardozo80 Neither of these authorities pro-
vide a conclusive resolution of the issue. Although Dean Paulsen
finds the resulting formality created by juries in juvenile proceed-
ings to be undesirable, a subsequent statement by him indicates
that, under certain circumstances, he finds no objection to opening
the hearing to the pubiic and plays down the significance of an
informal hearing.8 ' Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement in Palko v.
72. In re Gault, eupra note 14, at 31.
73. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, STANDARDS
FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 73 (1966) (hereinafter refferred to as STANDARDS).
74. Id. at supplement p.1, March 29, 1968.
75. In re Gault, supra note 14, at 49-50.
76. "Procedure is to law what 'scientific method' is to science." (citation omitted) Id.
at 21.
77. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 38.
78. "The Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault, which deals with many of the issues
considered in chapter 1, was handed down while the chapter was in press, and it has not
been revised to reflect that opinion .... " Id. at xi, 1.
79. "A jury trial would inevitably bring a good deal more formality to the juvenile
court without giving a youngster a demonstrably better fact-finding process than trial
before a judge." Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L'. IEV. 547, 559
(1957).
80. Supra note 61.
81. "The right to a jury trial is preserved in some states and the Juvenile courts still
function with Jury trials, although, in fact, the right is usually waived. A constitutional
right to a public trial has rarely been invoked. If a child properly advised by parents and
counsel, wishes a pub~lic trial, why should he not have it? In my view the reformers, in
their desire to distinguish sharply between juvenile and criminal proceedings and In the
hope that children would be processed as patients in a clinic or given social education
as in a school, put too much emphasis on the need for informal procedure. The child and
Connecticut has been discussed earlier and was shown to have
questionable validity.
2
Finally, the most recent authoritative source is the Uniform
Juvenile Court Act which was drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the
American Bar Association on August 7, 1968. That Act specifically
denies jury trials" without expressing a reason for adopting such
a view.
These aforementioned sources present no conclusive documen-
tation to support the contention that juries are unnecessary in secur-
ing fundamental' fairness and due process in delinquency proceed-
ings. They should, however, be placed in their proper perspective
and be given some thought for the remainder of this article to
determine whether their views are supported by evidence.
An overview of the merits of the jury issue can be divided into
an analysis of policy and legal considerations. Unfortunately, most
of the material concerning this issue is in the form of opinionated
policy statements with little factual or legal analysis. These policy
arguments are valuable, but only to a limited extent. Delinquency
proceedings are conducted in courts, not clinics, and the primary
objective of any court is to administer justice. u Therefore, the legal
considerations ought to be controlling in determining whether juries
should be provided juveniles.
A. Policy Considerations
Youths coming before juvenile courts were to be given preferen-
tial treatment for the surrender of certain constitutional rights.s5
They were to be tried in a non-criminal atmosphere where the
judge would be interested solely in adjusting the youthful offender
to his environment and society.8 6 Constitutional safeguards, including
the right to trial by jury, were denied on the following grounds:
1. that the juvenile court originated from early chancery proceed-
ings which were civil, not criminal in nature; 2. that juveniles are
protected from the stigma that is attached to criminal proceedings;
3. that a juvenile is not penalized, but is rehabilitated in separate
proceedings and facilities; 4. that such proceedings and their results
his parents are under no illusion. They know they are in court, not in school or at a
doctor's office." Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constituttonal Context of Juvenile
Cases, THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1966, 186.
82. See discussion, supra notes 60-63.
83. "Hearings under this Act shall be conducted by the court without a jury, in an
informal but orderly manner, and separate from other proceedings not included in section
3." JUVENILE COURT ACT § 24(a) (1968).
84. Paulsen, The Juvenile Court and the Whole of the Law, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 597,
598 (1965) ; STANDARDS, supra note 73, at 9; Warren, Equal Justice for Juveniles, Vol. 15,
No. 3 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 14, 15 (1964).
85. See Ketcham, The Unfilled Promise of the American JuVenite Court, in JUSTICE FOR
THE CHILD 22 (M. Rosenheim, ed 1962).
86. Id. at 26.
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are confidential; 5. that the informality of these proceedings will
assist in the rehabilitation process; 6. that the distinctions between
judge and jury do not justify jury trials in juvenile proceedings;
and 7. that the rare exercise of the jury right in jurisdictions pro-
viding for their use indicates the lack of any need for them. A brief
analysis of each of the foregoing arguments casts a doubtful
shadow upon their merit. s7
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose
of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise
serious questions as to whether actual performance mea-
sures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tol-,
erable the immunity of the process from the reach of consti-
tutional guarantees applicable to adults. s8
There is evidence . . . that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.8 9
(1) Origin of juvenile court
Courts have relied upon the fact that juvenile proceedings are
civil and not criminal in origin to deny children constitutional pro-
tections that are provided adults.90 Two primary theories have been
advanced concerning the origin of the juvenile court.91 Judge Julian
Mack advocated a "chancery theory" which found a direct relation-
ship between the English court of chancery and today's juvenile
court system. 92 This approach contends that juvenile proceedings
arose out of the court of chancery where the King, through his
chancellors, exercised protective jurisdiction over children under
the parens patriae doctrine. This may be partially true but even
Judge Mack recognized that "[o]ur common criminal law did not
differentiate between the adult and the minor who had reached
the age of criminal responsibility, [which was] seven at common
law. . .. ,'93 Therefore, at least to the extent that delinquency pro-
ceedings replaced criminal hearings, juvenile proceedings perform-
ed a function previously performed by criminal courts.
A second theory is a "criminal theory," advocated by Dean
87. For a detailed analysis of these arguments, see Ketchan, supra note 85.
88. Kent v. United States, supra note 16, at 555.
89. Id. at 556.
90. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905) is the landmark case sup-
porting the view that juvenile proceedings are civil in nature. See eupra note 44.
91. For a detailed analysis of the various theories that have been advanced, See, TASK
FORcE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
92. Mack, aupra note 8, at 104.
93. 1e. at 106.
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Roscoe Pound. In explaining the origin of the juvenile court, he
stated:
[T]here are many cases of creative action which has made
new chapters in the law or new legal institutions almost at
a stroke. ***American law may furnish an example in the
institution known as the Juvenile Court. This institution,
which is making its way everywhere, is due to the initi-
ative of a few definitely known socially minded judges, who
had the large vision to see what was required and the good
sense not to be hindered in doing it because there had never
been such things before. Today we find a legal basis for it
in the jurisdiction of chancery over infants. We reconcile it
with legal-historical dogmas on this basis. But the jurisdic-
tion of equity over infants was not a factor in creating it. It
arose on the criminal side of the courts because of the re-
volt of those judges; consciences from legal rules that re-
quired trial of children over seven as criminals and sentence
of children over fourteen to penalties provided for adult
offenders.9 4
Such a view accounted for the criminal aspect of juvenile pro-
ceedings but appears not to have considered the dependency and
neglect functions of the juvenile court.
The parens patriae doctrine, as originally applied, was concerned
solely with the child's welfare and limited the scope of its inquiry
to neglect and dependency matters. 95 Criminal violations and the
protection of society did not appear to be considerations which
prompted judicial action. 9 Thus, delinquency matters do not appear
to have been a part of the parens patriae doctrine until juvenile
courts were established in the United States in 1899. 9 7
The uncertainty of the origin of juvenile court functions led
the Supreme Court, in Gault, to state:
The Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be a great
help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of ju-
veniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious rele-
vance.98
The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar sys-
tem is - to say the least - debatable. 9
These observations, taken with the views expressed by others, indi-
94. R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 134 (1923).
95. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION, 388, 392 (1960); TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 12, at 2.
96. Ketcham, supra note 85, at 23.
97. Id. at 24.
98. In re Gault, supra note 14, at 16.
99. Id. at 17.
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cate that the vague chancery background will not justify the denial
of due process to juveniles.100
Perhaps, rather than strain to apply questionable precedent in
support of the juvenile court's origin, this institution ought to be
recognized as a separate and distinct entity.' 0 ' The characteristics
of the system as well as the existing precedents do not identify
the juvenile system as being purely equitable or criminal. A logical
explanation for the system's inception is that its creators developed
an institution for the processing and care of youthful offenders that,
without design, contains characteristics of two earlier systems of
justice.10 2
(2) Stigma
The juvenile system has sought to protect the youthful offender
from the stigma that is attached to criminal proceedings. Authorities
seek to avoid this stigma by trying children in a "delinquency"
rather than a "criminal" proceeding and by labeling them "delin-
quents" rather than "criminals.' 0 3
Professor Paul W. Tappan, a noted sociologist and authority in
the field of juvenile delinquency, has
observed that delinquency carries a stigma quite comparable
to that attached to the criminal status. In many cases the
adjudication and other related experiences may be a more
severe psychic blow to the child than criminal conviction is
to the adult. 0 4
A similar observation is a recent juvenile delinquency study led
to the recommendation that:
[I]n the absence of evidence on the beneficial effects of
100. "If the result of an adjudication of delinquency is substantially the same as a
verdict of guilty, the youngster has been cheated of his constitutional rights by false
labeling. We cannot take away precious legal protection simply by changing names from
'criminal prosecution' to 'delinquence' proceedings.' " Paulsen, supra note 79, at 550. See
also Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387, 388 (1961) ;
Tappan, Juridicial & Administrative Approaches to Children with Problems, in JUSTICE FOR
THE CHILD 159 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
101. This view is supported in STANDARDS where the statement is made that: "The
founders of the juvenile court found precedents in chancery cases but juvenile courts
were not actually derived from courts of chancery. Specialized children's courts are in
fact spedial statutory courts having jurisdiction over certain causes and as such have
their own procedure adapted to the type of case heard." STANRnDS, supra note 73, at 71.
102. Schramm, The Juvenile Court Idea, Vol. 13, No. 3 FED. PROBATION 19, 20 (1949).
103. "To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to
save it from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to take it in hand
and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it from the stigma, -
this is the work whic*h is now being accomplished by dealing even with most of the
delinquent children through the court that represents the parens patriae power of the
state, the court of chancery." Mack, supra note 8, at 109. See also Schramm, 4d. at 21.
104. P. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 392. See also Gardner, Let's Take Another Look At
The Juvenile Court, Vol. 15, No. 4 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 13, 15 (1964) ; Paulsen, supra note
84; Sheridan, Juveniles Who Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in a Correctional
System? 31 FED. PROBATION 26, 28 (1967) ; TASK FORCE RPmoRT, 8upra note 12 at 30, 92-93.
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official contacts, every effort should be made to avoid the
use of a formal sanctioning system and particularly the offi-
cial pronouncement of delinquency. Such a position is justi-
fied on grounds of the potentially damaging effects of the
labeling process. 05
Query: does the distinction between "criminal" and "delin-
quent" justify the denial of constitutional safeguards for children?
Stigma attaches to delinquents and criminals alike. Yet, in most
jurisdictions, only accused adults have a right to a jury trial.
Such a result appears to give an accused child less-not greater-
protection than his adult counterpart.1"6 A jury trial would not solve
the "stigma" dilemma but at least it would give a respondent the
right to select the trier of fact believed to be fairest and thus be
given access to the "best of both worlds."
(3) Separate proceedings and facilities
Under juvenile court theory, a juvenile who has committed a
criminal act is not to be penalized but rather is to be rehabilitated
in a training school. 10 7 Advocates of this theory contend that the
rehabilitation process ought to begin with a hearing in a setting
that is divorced from the atmosphere surrounding criminal hear-
ings. 10 8 To accomplish this, however, fundamental constitutional pro-
tections provided accused criminals were discarded as mere rem-
nants of criminal proceedings that would not serve the best interest
of a child. Whether present detention facilities and special court
treatment justify the denial of basic constitutional rights in an ad-
judicatory hearing is questionable indeed.
Present juvenile training facilities do not appear to meet the
standard of those envisioned by Judge Mack. He declared:
[A] real school, not a prison in disguise, must be pro-
vided. *** What is needed is a large area, preferably in
the country,--- because these children require the fresh air
and contact with the soil even more than does the normal
child, --- laid out on the cottage plan, giving opportunity for
105. S. WHEELER, L. COTT ELL & A. RoMASCO, supra note 10 at 24.
106. Juveniles have been denied such basic rights as the right to ball, the presumption
of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt because theoretically they were not
charged with a crime. See Gardner, supra note 104, at 15.
107. Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W. 205 (1929).
108. "In place of juries, prosecutors, and lawyers trained in the old conception of law
and staging dramatically, but often amusingly, legal battles, as the necessary paraphernalia
of a criminal court, we have now probation officers, physicians, psychologists, and
psychiatrists, who search for the social, physiological, psychological, and mental back-
grounds of the child in order to arrive at reasonable and just solutions of Individual
cases. In other words, in this new court we tear down primitive prejudice, hatred, and
hostility toward the lawbreaker in that most hide-bound of all human institutions, the
court of law, and we attempt, as far as possible, to administer justice in the name of
truth, love and understanding." Lou, supra note 1 at 2.
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family life, and in each cottage some good man and woman
who will live with and for the children. Locks and bars and
other indicia of prisons must be avoided; human love, sup-
plemented by human interest and vigilance, must replace
them.
1 09
As stated earlier, several authorities and studies have taken note
of the fact that most training schools are no more than "junior
prisons" which are understaffed, overcrowded and lack the adequate
funds and facilities to carry out the desired rehabilitation. 110 Even
more startling is the realization that several jurisdictions permit
the transfer of a child to a reformatory on the basis of a juvenile
proceeding."' Under such conditions, children are being denied
hearings which meet due process standards before being confined in
inadequate facilities. Courts cannot control the quality of detention
facilities but they can see to it that a child receives a fair hearing
to determine whether he, in fact, needs rehabilitation. A jury trial
would compliment this objective in situations where the juvenile
believes the jury to be the fairest trier of fact.
(4) Confidentiality
Children have been promised that their legal treatment shall
remain at least confidential-if not constitutional. 12 Confidentiality is
a fundamental concept of juvenile philosophy which is still pursued
today. 1 3 Unfortunately, the promise of confidentiality has been
broken.14 The Honorable Orman W. Ketcham, Judge of the District
of Columbia Juvenile Court, has observed:
A study of the New York City Children's Court revealed
that representatives of the FBI, the Civil Service, the Army,
the Red Cross, the Travelers Aid Society, various social
agencies, the Hack License Bureau, and the Department of
Public Welfare had access to the Court's legal records de-
spite the usual statutory provision that "no adjudication un-
der the provisions of this Act shall operate as a disqualifi-
cation of any child."''15
Such violations of the promise are clearly not in the best interest
of the child.
The effect of strict confidentiality upon the deterrent and
109. Mack, supra note 8, at 114.
110. Supra note 11.
111. Wilson v. Coughlin, 147 N.W.2d 175 (Iowa 1966) permitted such a procedure. For
similar cases condoning such action, see page 180 of that opinion.
112. Ketcham, supra note 85.
113. JUVENILE COURT AcT § 24(d) ; STANDARDS, supra note 73, at 76-77.
114. See Paulsen, supra note 84, at 615; Rappeport, Determination of Delinquency in
the Juvenile Court, A Suggested Approach, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 123, 134-136.
115. Ketcham, supra note 85, at 29, Citing A. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN 59-60 (1953).
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rehabilitative policies of juvenile courts has never been isolated and
studied in detail. One authority has observed:
It is . . . a frustrating fact that the effect of open or closed
juvenile hearings and publicity attendant upon such hear-
ings can be answered only in terms of statistical probabili-
ties, mingled with an embarrassing amount of pure guess-
work, and neither with the exactness that an impregnable
polemical position would appreciate nor with the exactness
that persons taking such a position often assume. 118
Thus, the President's Commission has recommended that juvenile
courts concentrate less upon rehabilitating children and more upon
administering justice in accordance with due process of law. 1" 7
The exposure of the juvenile's conduct and statements to out-
siders would, undeniably, have the effect of destroying a part of the
confidentiality which surrounds delinquencey proceedings. But, is
such a result undesirable per se? When a child admits the acts he
is accused of committing, strict adherence to absolute confidentiality
is perhaps in the best interest of the child. An innocent child who
vehemently denies the formal accusations filed against him, how-
ever, is going to be more interested in seeking the most expedient
means of proving his innocence than in making certain his hearing
remains completely confidential. Furthermore, a child would have
the right to refuse a jury trial if he feels it is in his best interest
to do so. Providing a child access to a jury trial would at least give
him the opportunity to decide who shall determine the facts of
his case.
(5) Formality
Another premise underlying existing juvenile court philosophy
is that informal hearings are in the best interest of the child.118
Procedural due process, with its evidentiary standards and proce-
dural restrictions, naturally contributes to the formality of a hearing
and therefore has been excluded from delinquency hearings. Kent
116. Gels, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 101, 124
(1958).
117. "The cases that fall within the narrowed jurisdiction of the court and filter
through the screen of pre-jucicial, informal disposition modes would largely involve of-
fenders for whom more vigorous measures seem necessary. Court adjudication and dis-
position of those offenders should no longer be viewed solely as a diagnosis and pre-
scription for cure, but should be frankly recognized as an authoritative court judgement
expressing society's claim to protection. While rehabilitative efforts should be vigorously
pursued in deference to the youthfulness of the offenders and in keeping with the veneral
commitment to individualized treatment of all offenders, the incapacitative, deterrent, and
condemnatory purposes of the judgement shou[I]d not be disguised. Accordingly, the
adjudicatoryl hearing should be consistent with basic principles of due process." THE
PREsIDENT's COMMIssION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, THE
CIHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 81 (1967) (hereinafter referred to as the PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION).
118. Estes v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d 205, 208 (Wash. 1968).
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and Gault have modified this view, however, by stating that due
process standards must be met in juvenile hearings. 119
One court, in denying jury trials in delinquency proceedings,
argued that one of the substantial benefits of juvenile proceedings
is the informal hearing conducted outside the presence of a jury.12°
Such a contention has not gone unchallenged. 121 The President's
Commission has observed:
[T]here is increasing evidence that the informal proce-
dures, contrary to the original expectation, may themselves
constitute a further obstacle to effective treatment of the
delinquent to the extent that they engender in the child a
sense of injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and
challengeless exercise of authority by judges and probation
officers. 1 2 2
The introduction of a jury into the adjudicatory stage of delin-
quency proceedings would affect the flexibility of the hearing and
alter the judge's relationship to the child. A jury trial, however
would not affect the flexibility of the dispositional phase of delin-
quency proceedings and would not interfere with the judges's rela-
tionship to the child in the determination of proper disposition
of the case. An adjudicatory hearing is designed to make an accurate
determination of the facts and not to begin rehabilitation of the
youth based upon a preconceived notion that he has committed
the alleged acts. To accurately determine the facts, certain rules
and procedures must be provided.
[T]rial by jury is not a matter of form-like a judge's
robe or gavel-but of substance, the product of long his-
torical experience and expressing a profound judgement by
our legal system about the means of adjudicating criminal
behavior. 2 3
(6) Distinctions between triers of fact
The argument that a jury is no better than a judge as a trier
of fact has been advanced to support the denial of jury trials in
delinquency proceedings . 24
119. In re Gault, supra note 14 at 20; Kent v. United States, supra note 16, at 562.
120. Estes v. Superior Court, supra note 118, at 208.
121. "Unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenile who has
violated the law may not feel that he Is being fairly treated and may therefore resist
the rehabilitation efforts of court personneL" S. WHERLER, L. COT-rRELL & A. ROMASCO,
supra note 10, at 33.
See also Gardner, supra note 104, at 14; Rappeport, supra note 114 at 161-162.
122. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 117, at 85. "In theory the court's operations
could justifiably be informal, its findings and decisions made without observing ordinary
procedural safeguards, because it would act only in the best interest of the child. In fact
it frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive a child of liberty without due process
of law .... " TAsK FoRcE REPOaT, supra note 12, at 9.
123. Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 17, at 23.
124. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa.Super; 62, 234 A.2d 9, 17 (1967) ; Paulsen, supra
note 79.
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The most current, exhaustive and authoritative statement on
the merits of the criminal jury has been compiled by Harry Kalven
and Hans Zeisel. 12 Their study did not attempt to evaluate whether
the judge or jury is more qualified to determine the facts of a case
but concentrated upon the ways in which the two differed. The value
of the study, as it relates to delinquency proceedings, is limited
to the extent that the questionnaire used was not designed to procure
juvenile data.12 6 Two factors analyzed by the study appear to be
significant as they relate to delinquency proceedings.
First, the study indicated that, when considering the age of the
accused, jurors were most sympathetic toward persons under twenty-
one years of age.127 In disagreeing with the jury, the judge often
found it relevant to comment on the youthfulness of the defendant. 128
Judge and jury respond to certain facts and circumstances differ-
ently 129 and when an accused adult believes that his case would be
heard more favorably before a jury than a judge, he may exercise
his right to trial by jury. If jurors generally express more sympathy
than judges toward young persons, why should a child be denied
access to a trial by jury?
A second factor brought out by the study was that often a
judge has access to information which should not be considered
when making his factual determination.
[I]n addition to his wide experience with the likelihood
that the defendant before him is guilty, the judge is ex-
posed to prejudicial information which the law, in its re-
gard for the right of the defendant, aims to screen out of
the evaluation of his guilt or innocence. The laws ideal in
these situations may be something of a libertarian luxury.
Our only point is that the law cannot easily achieve it without
the jury.1 30
Juvenile proceedings are not exempt from such conditions. A juvenile
judge, through pre-trial hearings and motions has access to social
records, probation reports and similar documents which contain
hearsay and prejudicial data not relevant to the charges brought
against a child.' s1 Having access to such information before hearing
125. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
126. "Youth here may mean any age from 18 to the early twenties. Through an over-
sight the questionnaire was not gauged to pick up the precise age of the defendant within
this range. This and the fact that the survey has no data at all on the juvenile offender
in the technical sense,, for whom because of the separate court system, jury trial is not
available, limits the significance of any analysis of the youth factor."Id. at 200, n. 13.
127. Id. at 211, Table 65 and comments thereto.
128. Id. at 200.
129. Id. at 106.
130. Id. at 127.
131. Tappan, Juridicial and Administrative Approaches to Children with Problems, in
JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 158 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
See also TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 394; Rappeport, supra note 114, at 135-136.
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the merits of the case is similar to a procedure that has been con-
demned by the United States Supreme Court. 3 2
No problem arises where the judge waives jurisdiction over the
child to the adult criminal court. There, the juvenile is protected
by the evidentiary rules of that court, as well as the right to a
trial by jury. 13
The difficulty arises when the juvenile judge who presided over
the waiver hearing and ruled on pre-trial motions decides to retain
jurisdiction over the child and adjudicate the case himself. An even
more disturbing situation arises when the juvenile judge determines
the merits of the case in a waiver hearing. In re Whittington3 4
was a case which apparently found a fourteen year old boy to have
committed murder solely upon the information provided the judge
at a waiver hearing.135 It is unfortunate, to say the least, that a
young boy can be found guilty under such haphazard procedures.
In light of the singular purpose of a waiver hearing 13s and the type
of evidence considered therein, such a situation should never be
allowed to exist. 1'3 7
The most practical solution for assuring that such prejudicial
circumstances do not affect the factual determination of a juvenile's
case would be to grant the juvenile a right to a jury trial.
132. A trial for contempt was heard before the same judge who presided over the Mich-
igan one-man grand jury proceeding from which the contempt charge arose. In finding
such a procedure to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the
Supreme Court stated: "[Our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness. * * * This Court has said . . . that 'every procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . . . not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due
process of law.' Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by Judges who have no
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between
contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way 'Justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.' " (citations omitted). In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
133. When a Juvenile's case has been waived to regular criminal jurisdiction, the trial
court cannot import juvenile court rules that are not applicable under the court's criminal
jurisdiction. Pee v.,United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
134. In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968).
135. At the close of the hearing, the Judge stated: "The court finds that there has been
a crime committed here, that there has been a homicide committed on the alleged victim,
and the court 'finds that there is probable cause to believe that this young defendant may
have done this act, which, if done by an adult, would be a felony. And, at this time, it is
the order of the court that the boy be examined, physical and mental examination be made
of such child, by the Bureau of Juvenile Research, called the Diagnostic Center of the
Youth Commission." (emphasis added). In re 'Whittington, 13 Ohio App.2d 11, 233 N.E.2d
333, 338-339 (1967).
For further discussion of the procedure adopted by the juvenile judge, see In re Whit-
tington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968); IN THE MATTER OF BUDDY LYNN WHITTINGTON, BRIEF OF THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES As AmIcus CURIAE 7.
136. "Waiver should be authorized . . . only after . . . the court finds that the child is
not committable to an institution for the mentally deficient or the mentally ill and is not
treatable in any institution or facility of the State designed for the care and treatment of
children, or where the court finds that the safety of the community clearly requires that
the child continue under restraint for a period extending beyond his minority or the facil-
ities of the criminal court provide a more effective setting for disposition." STANDARDS
supra note 73, at 35.
137. "The social study should never be confused with the evidence necessary to sub-
stantiate the facts alleged in the petition." STANDARDS, i& at 66.
"The purpose of the social study is to determine the care or treatment needed . . . not
to prove or disapprove that a delinquent act has been committed." STANDARDS, id. at 67.
NOTES
Judges have no recognized superiority over juries in the fact-
determining process. 138 A judge's "expertise presumably lies in the
selection among dispositional alternatives and the formulation plans
of individualized treatment." 13 9
(7) Rare exercise of jury right
An examination of the few times jury trials have been requested
in juvenile jurisdictions which provide for them, might indicate
that the right to a jury is not of value to juveniles.140 In Denver,
Judge Philip B. Gilliam has had only two requests for a jury trial
in twenty-five years and both requests were withdrawn before trial.1
4 1
Judge Gilliam explained:
I feel the lawyers realize the purpose of the juvenile court;
that it is not primarily an adversary proceeding, but in the
interest of the child. A lawyer may ask for a jury trial in or-
der to gain more time for preparation, but the lawyers that
thoroughly understand the juvenile court philosophy usually
waive the jury trial before the hearing. 42
Because the right exists does not necessarily mean that it must
be exercised as often as in criminal court.143 A responsible attorney
is likely to find that, in the majority of delinquency cases he handles,
the best interest of his client would dictate the waiver of his right
to a jury trial. Such factors as the nature of the offense, the evidence
and the youth's personality may govern an attorney's decision. The
fact that a jury may not often be used should not preclude the
availability of this right in the exceptional situation where the best
interest of the juvenile would be served by a jury trial.'" In light
of the preceding analysis, the fear that access to the right of a
138. "[Cjontrary to an often voiced suspicion, the jury does by and large understand
the facts and get the case straight." H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 125, at 149.
"iTlhe jury's decision by and large moves with the weight and direction of the evid-
ence." H. KALvvN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 125, at 149.
139. Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 17, at 23.
140. H. Lou, supra note 1, at 137.
141. Letter from Judge Philip B. Gilliam, September 10, 1968 on file with the North
Dakota Law Review.
142. Id.
143. "We assume that In most cases jury trial will be waived as in the best interests
of the juvenile, and that it will be the exceptional case where a jury is demanded." Peyton
v. Nord, 437 P.2d 716, 726 (N.M. 1968).
"The right to trial by jury, hopefully to be seldom exercised, should be restored."
Boches, Juvenile Justice in California: An Evaluation, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 102 (1967).
144. "Certain procedural safeguards must be established for the protection of the rights
of parents and children. Although parties in these proceedings may seldom make use of
such safeguards, their availability is none the less important. They are required by due
process of law and are important not only for the protection of rights but also to help
insure that the decisions affecting the social planning for children are based on sound
legal procedure and will not be disturbed at a later date on the basis that rights were
denied." STANDARDS, supra note 73, at 8.
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jury trial would cause an overcrowding of already crowded juvenile
court calendars is unfounded. 1 5
B. Legal Considerations
Several cases have treated the issue of the juvenile's right
to a jury trial since Gault was announced. Unfortunately, their
analyses and varied conclusions fall short of solving this dilemma
satisfactorily. Only brief summaries of these decisions are presented
for the reader's evaluation.
One case, as dicta, balanced away the right to a jury trial in
juvenile proceedings by stating:
Young persons have the same constitutional rights as old-
er ones in delinquency and supervision jurisdiction, except
the right to a jury trial, which is balanced by our circum-
scribed power and the confidentiality here maintained in an
effort to keep the record of a child unblemished. 14 6
Two cases, having considered the jury issue in light of Gault,
denied the right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings. Estes
v. Superior Court 147 involved a juvenile charged with unlawfully
taking a vehicle without the owner's permission. Requests that
the proceeding be heard by a jury were denied. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Washington said that a jury trial in a juvenile
proceeding is not a constitutional requisite. The court explained
that juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature and that neither
the specific holding in Gault nor the reasoning upon which the
holding was based required the court to accept the contention that
a juvenile who is accused of an act that could lead to institutionali-
zation is entitled to the same rights as an adult accused of a similar
offense. 14 8 The court emphasized that "[o]ne of the substantial
benefits of the juvenile process is a private, informal hearing
conducted outside the presence of a jury.' 49
The second case that referred to Gault when denying a juvenile
the right to a jury trial was Commonwealth v. Johnson.150 There,
the juvenile was charged with rape and assault. The Pennsylvania
court, prior to remanding the case, discussed the jury trial issue.
145. Speaking of the jury - juvenile issue generally, Judge Gilliam stated: "For a
number of years it was a feeling of juvenile court judges that jury trials should not be
allowed. I took the opposite view, perhaps because the Coloado Statute has always allowed
jury trials on juvenile matters. In my opinion, the judges that took the contrary view
were worried about an evil that didn't exist . L..." etter from Honorable Philip B. Gil-
liam, September 10, 1968 on file with the North Dakota Law Review.
146. In re Ronny, 40 Misc.2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844, 860 (1963).
147. Supra note 118.
148. Id. at 207.
149. Id. at 208.
150. Supra note 124.
NOTES
The court emphasized that, at that time, the United States Supreme
Court had not applied the Sixth Amendment's right of a jury trial
to state proceedings. 15 1 After analyzing Gault, the court summarized
its view as follows:
The institution of jury trial in juvenile court, while not ma-
terially contributing to the fact-finding function of the court,
would seriously limit the court's ability to function in this
unique manner, and would result in a sterile procedure which
could not vary to meet the needs of delinquent children. 5 2
Three courts that have considered the issue in light of Gault
have applied the right to a jury trial to delinquency proceedings.
Those cases were: Nieves v. United States,153 Peyton v. Nord,14
and In re Rindell. 55 The Nieves156 case was a federal decision
that considered the direct applicability of the Sixth Amendment
to a District of Columbia delinquency proceeding."57 The court found
that the juvenile was faced with an impermissible choice. In order
to be entitled to a jury trial, he was forced to forego the sentencing
and other privileges of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and
be prosecuted under the marijuana laws applicable to adult viola-
tors. 5 8 In referring to Gault, the court said:
[W]e read Gault to require the availability of . . . [a
jury] in any federal juvenile proceeding in which a youth
is faced with incarceration for the commission of an act
alleged to be violative of federal law.*** [A]n FJDA pro-
ceeding which may lead to a juvenile's loss of liberty by in-
carceration, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury, is in nature a criminal prosecution, and the
constitutionally guaranteed right of a trial by jury in all
federal criminal prosecutions must, therefore, accompany
such a proceeding."59
A more recent state case, People v. Y.O. 2404,160 considered the
same issue in light of Gault, as well as the Nieves decision. That
151. The Duncan decision, decided shortly after this case, renders this argument in-
effective.
152. Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra note 124, at 17.
153. 280 F.Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
154. 437 P.2d 716 (N.M. 1968)
155. 36 U.S.L.W. 2468 (R.I. Fan. Ct. 1968).
156. Nieves v. United States, 280 F.Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
157. "[T]he Bill of Rights and not 'due process' governs federal juvenile court pro-
ceedings." Id. at 1004.
158. The court relied heavily upon United States v. Jackson, 262 F.Supp. 716 (D.C.
Conn. 1967) where the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act was found
violative of the adult defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. There, the de-
fendant was required to either plead guilty or waive a jury trial in order to avoid the
death penalty provision of the Kidnapping Act
159. Nieves v. United States, &uzpra note 156, at 1004.
160. People v. Y.O. 2404, 291 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1968).
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case distinguished the two earlier cases and concluded that the
right to a trial by jury is not applicable to juvenile proceedings. 161
A second case applying the right to a jury trial to juvenile
proceedings is Peyton v. Nord.162 There, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico limited the scope of its analysis of the jury issue to the state
constitution. The court found that the petitioner, who allegedly
violated a criminal statute, -had a right to a jury trial under the
New Mexico Constitution, regardless of "whether or not the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution would also
require it."165 Although the court did not rely on Gault, they said:
[I]f the reasoning of In re Gault . . . is applied in this
case it would be difficult, in our view, to escape the con-
clusion that the jury trial guarantees of Art. II, § 14, N.M.
Const., as well as those of the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution are likewise applicable. 6 4
Finally, a Rhode Island Family Court has stated:
The court is *** convinced that a juvenile is entitled to a
trial by jury under the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, via the Fourteenth Amendment, and
which in light of the Gault decision, . . . will undoubtedly,
in this court's opinion, be extended to the states. 65
The United States Supreme Court was confronted with the
jury trial issue during the last term of court, 86 but unfortunately
the case was remanded for further consideration in light of the
Gault decision. In that case, a fourteen year old boy was accused
of murdering a neighbor. One contention advanced by the petitioner
was that the juvenile proceeding violated his rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because he was
denied the right to a trial by jury.
The following statements made before the United States Supreme
Court in oral argument of the case are, to say the least, enlightening:
161. The court distinguished Nieves by stating that unlike the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, the New York Constitutlon expressly provides that "a clear and
positive waiver may be consciously executed." Id. at 514.
In summarily treating the Duncan decision, the court merely stated that: "[A]n ad-
Judication as a youthful offender is specifically not a crime and, thus should not be within
the Duncan decision. Id. at 514.
The court's final justification of its decision was that "[N]o appellate determination
has yet been made which hab extended the jury mandate provisions of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the States so as to include younthful offender proceedings and until such has
occurred, the constitionality of our statute should be upheld."Id at 514.
162. Peyton v. Nord, 437 P.2d 716 (N.M. 1968).
163. Id. at 722.
164. Id. at 723.
165. In re Rindell, 36 U.S.L.W. 2468 (R.I. Fan. Ct. 1968).
166. In re Whittington, supra note 134.
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NOTES
Mr. Justice Harlan: "What is his status now? Is he now in
jail?"
Mr. Supman: [counsel for petitioner] "Yes, he has been
in jail for 20 months."
Mr. Justice Fortas: "How long was the boy incarcerated
before the grand jury proceeding?"
"Over a year."
The Chief Justice: "What are the benefits that this juvenile
received by being taken to the juvenile court instead of an
adult trial court?"
Mr. Morehart: [prosecuting attorney] "True, if the juve-
nile was an adult he would have been entitled to bail."
"Well that's one thing on the deficit side for the Ohio ju-
venile court system. What is the next advantage?"
The prosecutor explained that the juvenile was not kept
in an adult jail. Nor, was he ever kept in solitary confine-
ment. The boy was kept "upstairs," counsel explained, and
was not mixed with the adult prisoners. "We cannot go out
and arrest another juvenile just to keep one company."
The Chief Justice: "Are there any other benefits?"
Mr. Justice Fortas: "I have read your brief. What did the
cedural rights afforded the juvenile that an adult would
not have received?"
"No."
Mr. Justice Brennan: "What was the basis for the issuance
of the arrest warrant?"
Mr. Morehart: "The circumstances of the death; we assum-
ed that the boy was guilty."
Mr. Merritt W. Green, Toledo, Ohio, counsel for the National
Counsel [sic] of Juvenile Court judges, [sic] argued
amicus curiae.
Mr. Justice Fortas: "I have read your brief. What did the
juvenile get in terms of protection that would not have been
afforded an adult under the same circumstances?"
Mr. Green: "Nothing accrued to this particular boy, but that
doesn't make this Statute unconstitutional." There was too
[sic] much "lawyering" in this case, Mr. Green explained.
Mr. Justice Fortas: "Perhaps there is not enough lawyer-
ing in the right spots."' 167
Any sound conclusion concerning the jury trial issue must be
167. The excerpt from the oral argument of In re Whlttington, 8upra note 134 was re-
ported In Vol. 3, No. 2 CRIMINAL LAW REPoRTER 4025-4027 (1968).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
justified in light of the Gault and Duncan decisions as well as the
United States Constitution.
A review of Gault and Duncan discloses several significant fac-
tors. The Gault decision applied Fifth and Sixth Amendment pro-
visions to the adjudicatory stage of delinquency proceedings when
a juvenile is charged with an alleged violation that carries the
possible consequence of commitment to a state institution.168 The
Duncan decision stated that the jury trial provision of the Sixth
Amendment is a fundamental right which must be provided in
state proceedings involving serious charges. 169
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
. . . an impartial jury. . . ." A literal reading of that provision
indicates that accused persons, without exception, shall enjoy the
right to a jury trial in all federal criminal proceedings. Such an
interpretation was expressed recently by a Federal District Court
in New York:
The right to a jury trial is available in all non-petty fed-
eral criminal prosecutions. U. S. Const. Amend. VI. Notwith-
standing the fact that the FJDA seems to indicate that feder-
al juvenile court proceedings are not to be considered crim-
inal, . . . we read Gault to require the availability of that
right in any federal juvenile proceeding in which a youth
is faced with incarceration for the commission of an act al-
leged to be violative of federal law. 70
Mr. Justice Fortas declared in the Gault decision that juvenile
delinquency proceedings which may lead to commitment to a state
institution must be considered criminal in nature for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' 71 A sim-
ilar finding was necessitated by the adoption of the Sixth Amendment
rights to notice, confrontation and counsel. 172 Based upon the pre-
ceding discussion of policy considerations as well as upon the facts
that certain delinquency proceedings resemble criminal hearings
and that the right to a jury trial is a fundamental due process
requirement in state criminal proceedings, a juvenile who is accused
168. The criminal distinction between felony and misdemeanor will not be applicable
to offenses occurring under most delinquency statutes because, regardless of the nature
of an act committed by a child, he may be placed into custody until he reaches his majority.
In re Boykin, 39 Ill.2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460, 462 (1968) ; See also In re Gault, supra note
14, at 13.
169. See the discussion of Dunoan in the body of this article whida covers supra notes
52-69.
170. Nieves v. United States, supra note 156, at 1004.
171. "To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble entice-
ment of the "civil" label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings."
In re Gault, supra note 14, at 49-50.
172. The rights contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution are
prefaced by the statement that those rights apply only to criminal proceedings.
N0TES
of violating a criminal statute ought to be provided the right to a
jury trial if he so desires.
The Supreme Court has noted certain desirable features of
the juvenile court,'173 but has also recognized that a juvenile court
must provide juveniles a hearing that measures up to the essentials
of due process. 74 Due process of law, as applied to juvenile proceed-
ings, would likely permit states to implement the jury trial provision
in a manner they believe to be most beneficial to children, should
the Supreme Court apply the right to juvenile proceedings. An
examination of the various jurisdictions that provide jury trials
indicates the varied ways in which that right has been implemented.
Several jurisdictions provide a jury trial only when a jury is de-
manded. 175 Other jurisdictions provide a jury made up of only six
members.7 6 Another jurisdiction provides a jury upon appeal.17 7
Still another refers the child to district court for trial by jury and
the case is then remanded to the juvenile court for disposition. 1 78
And, finally, one jurisdiction provides for a young adult advisory
panel to assist the judge in determining the facts. 1 79 Most, if not all,
of these varied approaches probably meet constitutional standards
since the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution merely requires that
accused persons have the right to an "impartial jury." That right,
applied through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
in all probability, would not require a higher standard when applied
to state juvenile proceedings.
Rehabilitation must begin with a fair and accurate determination
of the facts. s0 The emphasis of the Gault decision is clearly upon
the accuracy of the guilt determining process. If provision for trial
by jury will further that end, is it any justification to say that a
minor shall not have access to a jury because he will not be branded
a criminal if he is adjudicated a "delinquent"; that he will be
confined with junior criminals rather than adult criminals; or that
his treatment shall remain confidential except for the FBI, the
Civil Service, the Army, the Red Cross, the Travelers Aid Society,
various social agencies, and the Hack License Bureau? Will the
youth gain more comfort in knowing that some authority has deemed
it in the child's best interest to deny him access to a jury trial?
173. In re Gault, supra note 14, at 22-27.
174. Id. at 20. Kent v. United States, supra note 16, at 562.
175. D.C. CODE ENCYCLOPEDIA § 16-2307 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(2) (1957)
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-108(c) (1961).
176. MICH. COMP. LAWS ch. 712A § 17 (1968) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1110 (Supp.
1968); S.D. CODE § 43.0331 (1939).
177. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 56 (Supp. 1968).
178. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808 (Supp. 1967).
179. ALASKA STAT. § 47-10-070 (Supp. 1966).
180. TASK FORcE REPORT, supra note 12, at 30,
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Depotism is never justified because it intends to be benevo-
lent. Big Brother is not necessarily either rational or wise.181
RONALD K. CARPENTER
181. Douglas, Juvenile Court$ 4n4 Dfu Procems of Law, VoL 19, No. 1 Juv. CT. SuDGES 3.
15 (1968).
